DF83
Device Relay Resistance EntropyDevice Relay Resistance Entropy is the reader's own contribution of randomness to Kernel 2's relay-resistance protocol (RRP) - a timing-based defence against relay attacks, where a genuine card's proximity is faked by relaying its radio signal through an intermediary over a longer distance than contactless was ever meant to work at. The reader supplies fresh entropy via DF83 specifically so that a relayed session can't be replayed or precomputed by an attacker who doesn't control the timing of the exchange in real time; the whole defence depends on this value being genuinely unpredictable and generated anew for each attempt, the same design principle behind the terminal's Unpredictable Number (9F37) in the cryptogram flow, just applied to a completely different threat model. Scoped to Mastercard PayPass (Kernel 2), it's one of the more specialised fields in this dictionary - most engineers will never need to decode its value directly, since RRP's actual timing measurements happen at a layer below anything a TLV parser exposes, but its presence in a transaction log is a useful signal that relay-resistance was actually exercised, not merely configured. See EMV Contactless Book C-2.
Interactive decoder
Paste a hex value for this tag to decode it in your browser. Nothing is sent anywhere.
Binary (4): 5A6B7C8D
This tag is not a bitmap; the decoder shows a format-based interpretation.
Decoded example
Example value: 5A6B7C8D
Related tags
Properties
| Tag | DF83 |
|---|---|
| Name | Device Relay Resistance Entropy |
| Format | Binary |
| Length | 4 bytes |
| Source | Card (ICC) |
| Templates | — |
| Books | EMV Contactless Book C-2 |
Frequently asked questions
- What is EMV tag DF83?
- Device Relay Resistance Entropy is the reader's own contribution of randomness to Kernel 2's relay-resistance protocol (RRP) - a timing-based defence against relay attacks, where a genuine card's proximity is faked by relaying its radio signal through an intermediary over a longer distance than contactless was ever meant to work at. The reader supplies fresh entropy via DF83 specifically so that a relayed session can't be replayed or precomputed by an attacker who doesn't control the timing of the exchange in real time; the whole defence depends on this value being genuinely unpredictable and generated anew for each attempt, the same design principle behind the terminal's Unpredictable Number (9F37) in the cryptogram flow, just applied to a completely different threat model. Scoped to Mastercard PayPass (Kernel 2), it's one of the more specialised fields in this dictionary - most engineers will never need to decode its value directly, since RRP's actual timing measurements happen at a layer below anything a TLV parser exposes, but its presence in a transaction log is a useful signal that relay-resistance was actually exercised, not merely configured. See EMV Contactless Book C-2.
- What format and length does EMV tag DF83 use?
- Tag DF83 uses the Binary format and is normally 4 bytes long.
- Is tag DF83 provided by the card or the terminal?
- Tag DF83 (Device Relay Resistance Entropy) is provided by the Card (ICC).
Sources
- C-2-Kernel-2-V2.11-Final-June-2023, p. 373
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